This book is concerned with the history of metaphysics since Descartes. Taking as its definition of metaphysics 'the most general attempt to make sense of things', it charts the evolution of this enterprise through various competing conceptions of its possibility, scope, and limits. The book is divided into three parts, dealing respectively with the early modern period, the late modern period in the analytic tradition, and the late modern period in non-analytic traditions. In its unusually wide range, A. W. Moore's (...) study refutes the tired old cliché that there is some unbridgeable gulf between analytic philosophy and philosophy of other kinds. It also advances its own distinctive and compelling conception of what metaphysics is and why it matters. Moore explores how metaphysics can help us to cope with continually changing demands on our humanity by making sense of things in ways that are radically new. (shrink)

A.W. Moore presents eighteen of his philosophical essays, written since 1986, on representing how things are. He sketches out the nature, scope, and limits of representation through language, and pays particular attention to linguistic representation, states of knowledge, the character of what is represented, and objective facts or truths.

Spend a year dwelling on the awesomeness of God with A. W. Tozer. He will expand your faith in a God so great that words fall short to describe Him. He will nourish you with truth. Encounter Tozer's heart and wisdom like never before in this newly revised edition.

I shall argue that the central doctrines of Locke's politics have a theological basis, a doctrine of Creation similar to the Thomist one. Locke does not elaborate this doctrine; he presupposes it. It is not a hidden, esoteric element in his thought; it is there on the surface, but in a scattered and fragmentary form.I shall proceed in this fashion: First, I shall set out this doctrine of Creation and show its connexion with Locke's moral theory by way of an (...) examination of his doctrines of property and power. I shall then show that Locke extends this doctrine of Creation to human productive activity with crippling results for his political theory. (shrink)

In this bold and innovative new work, A.W. Moore poses the question of whether it is possible for ethical thinking to be grounded in pure reason. In order to understand and answer this question, he takes a refreshing and challenging look at Kant’s moral and religious philosophy. Identifying three Kantian Themes – morality, freedom and religion – and presenting variations on each of these themes in turn, Moore concedes that there are difficulties with the Kantian view that morality can be (...) governed by ‘pure’ reason. He does however defend a closely related view involving a notion of reason as socially and culturally conditioned. In the course of doing this, Moore considers in detail, ideas at the heart of Kant’s thought, such as the categorical imperative, free will, evil, hope, eternal life and God. He also makes creative use of the ideas in contemporary philosophy, both within the analytic tradition and outside it, such as ‘thick’ ethical concepts, forms of life and ‘becoming those that we are’. Throughout the book, a guiding precept is that to be rational is to make sense, and that nothing is of greater value to use than making sense. (shrink)

Talking Politics is a philosophical examination of some of the basic concepts of political discourse. Its primary focus is on the ordinary ; on what is said by politicians, in newspapers and by people in pubs, rather than on the works of political theorists. This is a work of , but not on political theory. Talking Politics is: * Invaluable as a source of reference for students, and contains a detailed index * Arranged thematically, around topics such as `Nation'. Each (...) entry has copious cross-references and suggestions for further reading A. W. Sparkes is uniquely qualified to write such a book, combining some thirty years' teaching as a philosopher with wide experience of, and a life-long fascination with, politics. His attitude is that of a critical, but uncynical, observer. (shrink)

There remains the problem of accounting for the appeal of transcendental idealism. Transcendental idealists themselves may say that there is nothing wrong with the doctrine, but only with the attempt to express it, the point being that it is inexpressibly true: but I argue that this does not extricate them from the trap of self‐stultification. An importantly different proposal, which I derive from the earlier work of Wittgenstein, is this: while we cannot coherently state that transcendental idealism is true we (...) are shown that transcendental idealism is true, where ‘A is shown that x’ is defined as ‘ A has ineffable knowledge, and when an attempt is made to put that knowledge into words, the result is: x.’ I try to indicate how, provided we can make sense of and, this proposal has the threefold merit of: avoiding self‐stultification; being compatible with the incoherence of transcendental idealism; and providing an account of transcendental idealism's appeal. (shrink)

A special issue on ‘Private Autonomy and Public Paternalism’ constitutes the first part of this issue. Guest-editors are Annette Dufner and Michael Kühler, both from the University of Munster, Germany. It is often assumed that personal autonomy is a ‘private’ matter in the sense that it is based primarily on a person’s subjective characteristics and capabilities. At the same time, the literature mainly deals with paternalism as a problem of the ‘public’ sphere, for example by focusing on the dangers that (...) threaten the autonomy of individuals as citizens, such as state paternalism. However, it is widely acknowledged nowadays that personal autonomy can only develop and flourish if conditions in the social and relational sphere are favourable, which means that personal autonomy is not so private after all. At the same time, it should be clear that paternalism not only relates to our behaviour in the public sphere, but also to how we behave in more private social spheres, like family, frien. (shrink)

An illuminating guide to the pervasiveness and intricacies of law and an ideal invitation for those interested in its mechanics, purposes and functions. It is a thorough guide to a mysterious and complex institution and profession.

I argue that both Kant and, in his later work, Wittgenstein indicate the possibility of just such a transcendental‐idealist response to the Basic Argument. I also argue, however, that transcendental idealism, for all its appeal, is incoherent. This is because its attempt to invoke the ‘transcendent’ is an attempt to invoke that which, by definition, cannot be invoked. So, it does not provide an alternative to unregenerate endorsement of the Basic Argument after all.

The revival of interest in Carnap’s philosophy over the past two decades has shed much light on particular aspects of his intellectual development and its context. We now have a better appreciation of the background and motivation of the Aufbau. 1 The radical nature of the Syntax program has fmally, more than half a century after its first publication, begun to be acknowledged.2 And the later Carnap has also been re-assessed; the previously widespread impression that Quine was “right” and Carnap (...) “wrong” in the analytic-synthetic debate has yielded to a more balanced view3, and the broad outlines of Camap’s late philosophy have begun to emerge. (shrink)